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Introduction
Voluntary contributions account for the provision of many public goods, ranging from essential infrastructure, education, to health care. The seminal contribution of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986, known as BBV) provides the groundwork for the analysis of the private provision of pure public goods. Although there are influential antecedents of Malinvaud (1972) and Becker (1974) , BBV provide the most rigorous treatment of the private provision model and present some of its startling results, such as showing that as the economy grows large, the average contribution goes to zero and only the wealthy contribute. BBV also develop the well-known 'neutrality' results of Warr (1983) , where exogenous income redistribution among contributors-that leaves the set of contributors unchanged-has no effect either on the aggregate provision of public goods or the consumption of private goods. The neutrality result, further analysed by Bernheim (1986) and Andreoni (1989) , is related to complete crowding-out of budget neutral government provision, 'dollar-for-dollar', which provides sharp testable implications.
Recent work on public goods in networks, initiated by the key paper of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) , has many interesting facets and applications. The technology of network analysis allows us to generalise from the provision of pure public goods, which benefit all agents, to a more detailed model of local public goods with a heterogeneous benefit structure shaped by a network. In this paper, we generalise Bramoullé and Kranton's (2007) model to the case where each agent's public good contribution is constrained exogenously. Then we study Nash equilibria with no intermediate contributors-that is, Nash equilibria where agents are either full contributors or free-riders. Our analysis shows that these 'no-intermediate-contributors Nash equilibria' correspond to the k-insulated sets of the network.
As a special case, we obtain the key result of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) that specialised Nash equilibria-that is, equilibria with both full contributors and free-riders-correspond to maximal independent sets of the network, where no node in a set is connected to each other. If fact the concept of k-insulated set is a generalisation of the concept of maximal independent set since maximal independent sets correspond to the particular case of k = 0. It is worth noting that while both specialised equilibria and no-intermediate- 
Survey
Unlike Tiebout's seminal contribution, and the subsequent vast literature on the local public good model, the public goods in networks model allows for geographic spillovers among nearby communities.
1 The public goods in networks literature has burgeoned to include more general approaches: Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv 
Public goods in networks: constrained provision
Consider a model of public goods in networks-that is, local public goods with benefits accessible along geographic or social links. There are n agents arranged in a connected fixed network g. Let G = [g ij ] denote the adjacency matrix of the network g, where g ij = 1 indicates that agent i and agent j are neighbours in the network g and g ij = 0
otherwise. In particular, we assume that g ii = 0 for each agent i. We denote by N = {1, . . . , n} the set of agents and by N i = {j ∈ N | g ij = 1} the set of agent i's neighbours.
Each agent i faces a marginal cost c > 0 for providing a public good and his payoffs, for the profile of provisions x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ R N + , are given by:
where b is the benefit function, which is differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave such that b (k) = c, for any positive integer k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
We also assume that each agent i public good contribution is bounded x i ∈ [0, 1]. 
Proof. The best reply of each agent is
which gives the required results above.
Proposition 1 tells us the public good contribution of each agent at a Nash equilibrium.
We may distinguish three types of agents, free-riders, who contribute 0, full-contributors, who contribute 1, and the others, intermediate contributors-that is, 0 < x i < 1. Using a standard fixed-point argument, it is easy to show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for any network.
No-intermediate-contributors Nash equilibrium
Further work is needed in order to relate the shape of contribution profiles to the underlying network. To do so, in the following, we will focus on Nash equilibria with no equilibrium. We will use the following notion from graph theory: Definition 1 (Jagota, Narasimhan, andŠoltés (2001)). For a positive integer k, a kinsulated set of a network g is a set of players S ⊆ N such that each agent in S is adjacent to at most k other players in S and each agent not in S is adjacent to at least k + 1 players in S.
The concept of k-insulated set generalises maximal independent set since 0-insulated sets are exactly the maximal independent sets. We will illustrate NIC Nash equilibrium in few canonical network structures: the complete network and the star network (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 ).
For a complete network, observe that the (k − 1)-insulated sets correspond to subsets of agents of size k if 1 ≤ k < N and to the entire set of players if N ≤ k. Therefore, the number of NIC Nash equilibria increases initially and then decreases as k increases.
5
For a star network, observe that there are two 0-insulated sets consisting of either the core and the periphery agents. If k ≥ 1 then there exists only one k-insulated set (all periphery players for k + 1 < N and all players if k + 1 ≥ N ). Therefore, the number of Nash equilibria decreases as k increases.
Since there could be many Nash equilibria (either NIC Nash equilibria or other Nash equilibria) in our setting, a simple notion of stability based on Nash tâtonnement, similar 5 It is worth noting that while the number of contributors increases as k increases the number of NIC Nash equilibria does not always necessarily decrease.
to Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) , can be used to reduce the number of equilibria in a natural way. His neighbour(s) will adjust by increasing their own efforts. This increase can lead i to reduce his effort even more, which will lead the system away from the initial equilibrium. Now, consider a NIC Nash equilibrium where there are no free-riders, or every free-rider is linked to at least (k + 1) full contributors. Then it can be easily checked that the process described above no longer works since each full contributor agent will revert to his initial action.
Finally, recall that NIC Nash equilibria with k = 0 coincide with specialised equilibria in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) . More generally, it is worth noting that both specialised equilibria and NIC Nash equilibria obviously rule out intermediate contributors. Nonetheless, there is a key difference which is, unlike specialised equilibria, a NIC Nash equilibrium could be without free-riders. This key difference can be significant since whenever the network is connected, NIC Nash equilibria without free-riders are always stable, whereas stable specialised equilibria always have free-riders.
